Brackett v. Focus Hope, 482 Mich. 1001, 756 N.W.2d 70 (2008)
The Plaintiff was informed upon hire that the mission of the employer is to “seek racial equality and reconciliation”, and that attendance at the employer’s annual Martin Luther King Day celebration is a mandatory condition of employment.
After accepting the position, she refused to attend the celebration because it took place in Dearborn rather than its usual Detroit locale. According to the Plaintiff, she had prior personal poor racial experiences in Dearborn, and she did not believe the site was appropriate or in keeping with Dr. King’s aspirations.
Following her failure to attend, a number of oral and written communications took place between the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s human resources manager and chief executive officer. Although the claimant was not terminated, it was explained that her failure to attend the event did not reflect highly on her commitment to the employer or the employer’s mission. The Plaintiff alleged the communications subsequent to the Martin Luther King Day celebration resulted in psychological trauma, including major depression/mental disability which prevented her from returning to work.
The Plaintiff made a claim for benefits, and the employer defended on the basis of MCL 418.305, which provides in relevant part “If the employee is injured by reason of his intentional and willful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation under the provisions of this act.”
The Magistrate, WCAC, and the Court of Appeals awarded benefits to the claimant. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and denied benefits, stating the employee’s “refusal to attend an employer mandated event constituted ‘intentional and willful misconduct’” under the Act, and therefore, barred her recovery of benefits. The Court indicated the “Plaintiff’s deliberate and categorical refusal to attend this mandatory function constituted insubordination.”
The Brackett decision provides valuable clarification from the Court as to what conduct rises to the level of intentional and willful misconduct under Section 305. The Court indicated a particular level of egregiousness is not required for conduct to rise to the level of intentional and willful misconduct, nor is “moral turpitude”. The Court also clarified that the word “intentional” as used in the statute simply means “done with the intention of carrying out the act”. Conduct either is or is not intentional; there is no level of variance.
Brackett defined willful misconduct as a deliberate disregard by an employee of the employer’s interests, including its work rules and standards of conduct. This new definition is complementary to the definition of willful misconduct noted in earlier decisions, specifically, an employee’s “obstinate or perverse opposition to the will of the employer.”
When, as in this case, the employee is disciplined for intentional and willful misconduct as defined above and an injury or disability flows directly from the employer-imposed discipline, there is a proper basis for a denial of benefits under MCL 418.305.