Case Law Update

BCPWQ Seminar

2024

CAUSATION

Injury at Home
Ackley v Excell Pump & Swivel Services (Mich. WCBM 2023)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Kales
Plaintiff worked in the gas and oil industry as a pump repairer. At a prior employer, in 1992, he injured his right eye. He received workers’ compensation benefits but returned to work. He now alleges injury to his left eye; this was caused when a grinding wheel broke while he was removing a metal spur. Defendants disputed the injury was work related because it took place at Plaintiff’s home.
At trial, Plaintiff testified his job required him to always be on call, ready to drive to numerous oil fields that needed repair. He was issued a company truck that he kept at his house. He further testified he kept tools in the truck, both those issued by the employer and personal. It was his responsibility to maintain the truck and his tools, but he was reimbursed by the employer. He had wide discretion to determine when and how maintenance should be done.
On the alleged injury date Plaintiff was attempting to repair a pipe wrench that had been issued by his employer. He was using a grinder at his home when the grinder broke apart and some chunks flew into his left eye. There was no policy that states where or how repairs should be performed.
The magistrate ultimately awarded benefits. He opined that the employer derived a “special benefit” from the Plaintiff performing repairs of the tool at home, which created a sufficient nexus between the injury and employment. He noted that the Plaintiff did not break any company rules by performing the repair, and he was not disciplined in any way when the employer learned of the behavior that led to injury. More importantly, a representative of the employer testified at trial that the repair would enhance Plaintiff’s job performance, thus conceding that a special benefit was provided. Further, Plaintiff was performing the repair in anticipation of being called to a job where he expected to use the tool.

Ash v Flex Checks (Mich. WCBM 2023)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Housefield
Plaintiff alleged injury to his right leg, low back, and lower extremities. He claimed that on March 13, 2020 he fell while getting into his vehicle, in the course of his employment. Defendants argued that the injury did not arise out of employment.
At trial, Plaintiff’s supervisor testified Plaintiff worked as a sales representative. He further stated Plaintiff usually worked from home, but was expected to make in-person office visits to potential clients. Travel expenses were paid as part of Plaintiff’s compensation package. The supervisor further testified he was supposed to terminate Plaintiff’s employment on March 13, 2020 due to poor performance and the ongoing Covid pandemic. However, the supervisor did not contact Plaintiff until March 14, at which time Plaintiff advised of the alleged injury he sustained the day before.
Plaintiff testified that on March 13 he was scheduled to meet with a client in the morning. He went out to his truck, in the driveway of his house, to warm-up the truck. While attempting to enter the vehicle his right foot flipped on the running board and his left foot got caught under the truck. He fell and landed on his right hip. He then called his supervisor to report the injury and to state that he would not be able to make the appointment.
Ultimately, the Magistrate ruled that no benefits were owed. Although the injury arguably occurred on the employer’s premises, since Plaintiff worked remotely from home and he was at home, there was not a work relationship. Rather, Plaintiff testified he was going out to warm-up his truck when the injury occurred. He did not testify that he had any work materials with him. The Magistrate noted that the weather was quite nice that day, with a high of 53° and low of 40°. Plaintiff wanting to have a warm car had no relation to his employment and did not arise out of his employment.
Moreover, the Magistrate noted that there was conflicting testimony between Plaintiff and his supervisor which called into question Plaintiff’s credibility. Namely, he pointed to the different versions of events reported by the men with respect to the injury being reported. Plaintiff claimed that he reported the injury the same day it occurred, whereas the supervisor testified that Plaintiff reported it the following day.

Coming and Going
Rierson v Securitas (2024 ACO #1)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Woons
Litigation was initiated by the no-fault carrier, seeking reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid to Plaintiff related to a work-related pedestrian/motor vehicle accident. The sole issue at trial was whether Plaintiff’s injury occurred in the course of his employment. The Magistrate ruled that the injury did occur in the course of employment with Defendants and therefore covered by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a “flex” security officer. This generally required him to be available for any shift, and it was expected he would respond within four hours of being given an assignment. On the injury date Plaintiff was given an assignment at a fraternity house in East Lansing; this was a temporary special assignment, as Plaintiff was not scheduled to work at that time. He was to be reimbursed for mileage.
Plaintiff usually printed MapQuest directions to his assignments, as he did not use GPS, but on the injury date he did not have time. This led to difficulties locating the fraternity house. Plaintiff parked his car and walked around to look for the fraternity house but could not find it. He eventually contacted the fraternity for directions and learned that he was approximately two miles away. He attempted to cross the road to his car but was struck by a motor vehicle.
Generally, injuries sustained by an employee coming to or going from work are not compensable. However, there are exceptions to this rule: (1) the employee is on a special mission for the employer, (2) the employer derived a special benefit from the employee’s activity at the time of the injury, (3) the employer paid for or furnished employee transportation as a part of the contract of employment, (4) the travel comprised a dual purpose combining the employment-required business needs with the personal activity of the employee, (5) the employment subjected the employee to excessive traffic risks, and (6) the travel took place as a result of a split shift working schedule or employment requiring a similar irregular nonfixed working schedule. These exceptions are compensable because there is a sufficient nexus between the employment and injury such that the injury was a circumstance of the employment. Each exception should be treated as an independent consideration, not a factor to be balanced.
The Commission noted that the general rule expects that employees are traveling from a residence along a familiar route to a fixed location where the work is performed; the case at hand did not have a fixed employment location but that was not dispositive.
Turning to each exception, the Commission determined:
(1)   Special Mission. Plaintiff was not on a special mission. Although it was a last minute assignment, his job was to be ready at almost any time to go wherever he was needed.
(2)   Special Benefit. There was a special benefit provided to Defendants. Plaintiff was performing a “temporary special assignment” which was last-minute. Based on this, every urgent job that Plaintiff performed would be considered to have a special benefit.
(3)   Employer Paying For / Furnishing Transportation. Defendants paid for transportation. Plaintiff was paid mileage for travel more than 30 miles from his home, and the job in question was 44 miles away. It was required that Plaintiff have reliable transportation and noted that travel was considered an integral part of his job.
(4)   Dual Purpose. There was no dual purpose, as Plaintiff’s actions were undertaken to accomplish Defendant’s goal. He did not depart from his assignment, but rather was attempting to find the location he was dispatched to at the time of injury.
(5)   Excessive Exposure to Traffic Risks. Plaintiff was excessively exposed to traffic risks. He was sent to an unfamiliar location at the last minute late at night. He was unable to see address numbers from his car, which led him to checking addresses on foot. This represented “peril in the street different in kind from that of any other user of the street.”
(6)   Irregular Working Schedule. The Plaintiff was injured after the expected start time of 11 PM. He clearly worked a non-fixed schedule, as he was expected to accept jobs as they were assigned to him rather than working set, regular hours. The travel to each assignment location was an integral part of his job duties.
Ultimately, the Commission found that Plaintiff’s injury arose out of the course and scope of his employment; work was the occasion for his injury.

Avocational Factors
Lutz v Hayes Masonry (Mich. WCBM 2023)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Kales
Plaintiff was employed as a mason. He claimed that his employer instructed him to perform repair work around a residential hot tub, which took 2-3 weeks to complete. While performing repair work, the hot tub was running. Plaintiff alleged that breathing in steam from the hot tub caused Legionnaires’ Disease. His last day of work was May 7, 2019.
On May 7, 2019 he presented to Quick Care, after which he was transferred to McClaren Hospital and placed in a coma for 27 days. He had flu-like symptoms and felt very fatigued.
Plaintiff smoked for 50 years. He also testified that he used a cistern for water supply at his home, it was fed through “an underground spring”. This supplied all water in the home, including drinking water. The supply had never been tested. Plaintiff also reported that he often went to a local bar after work for a few drinks, which his girlfriend described as “a total dump”.
Medical testimony from the treating doctor at McLaren confirmed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with Legionnaires’. Possible causes of the infection were numerous; these included air conditioning systems, stagnant water, hot tubs, wet soil, and home plumbing. The doctor testified it was more likely than not Plaintiff was exposed to legionella by the hot tub.
Defendants provided testimony from the home owners, their spa technician, and an industrial hygienist. This testimony showed that the hot tub was cleaned weekly by a certified professional. There were two sanitization systems that ran 24/7 to keep the water filtered and clean. Further, the industrial hygienist testified that although legionella could commonly be linked to hot tubs, it was not common in an adequately treated hot tub that had proper water treatment maintenance and control measures in place. Rather, she testified it was less probable than not that legionella bacteria was present.
The Magistrate ultimately ruled that the alleged injury was not caused by the hot tub exposure and was therefore not compensable. Weekly benefits and medical benefits were denied.

BURDEN OF PROOF and EVIDENCE
Pro Se Plaintiff
Mills v DM Burr (2023 ACO #7)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Della Santina
Plaintiff’s Application sought approval for surgery and related medical expenses as the result of a knee injury he allegedly sustained while working as a janitorial supervisor. Defendants appealed the Magistrate’s order granting benefits based upon multiple objections to evidence admitted on the pro se Plaintiff’s behalf.
Plaintiff sustained a non-occupational right knee injury in 2016 that caused a tear of the medial meniscus and chondromalacia. Thereafter, he alleged that in March 2018 he sustained another injury to his right knee while at work. A post-injury MRI showed a medial meniscus tear and chondromalacia. He did not miss any time from work.
At trial Plaintiff presented a one-page report from Dr. Ryan, who treated him at Concentra. At Plaintiff’s request, Dr. Ryan reviewed MRIs from 2016 and 2018, ultimately opining that the work incident “caused increased tearing of the previously torn meniscus that is now symptomatic.” He did not render an opinion regarding the necessity of surgery. Defendants objected to admission of the exhibit because it was not an opinion rendered during the course of treatment and Dr. Ryan was not deposed. The Magistrate deferred a ruling on admissibility at the time of trial.
Defendants offered the IME report of Dr. Lawley, who was deposed, as evidence that there was not a medically distinguishable change in pathology. This was admitted as evidence without objection.
After trial, the Magistrate admitted Dr. Ryan’s report based upon a rule that allows magistrates wide discretion to admit evidence that is commonly relied upon by a reasonably prudent person. With that foundation, he ruled Plaintiff established a work-related right knee injury in March 2018, but he denied surgery because there was no basis for same based upon the proofs submitted.
The Commission held the Magistrate had sufficient basis to admit the report of Dr. Ryan. However, Defendants preserved objection to admission of the report because they were not afforded an opportunity to question Dr. Ryan as to the basis of his opinions. Accordingly, the matter was remanded so Defendants could respond to the report through an opportunity to depose Dr. Ryan.

Credibility
Morgan v LKQ (2023 ACO #6)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Heck
Plaintiff worked at an automobile scrap yard, where he removed saleable parts and then dismantled the remnants of vehicles. He testified regarding two distinct injury dates. First, he stated that in February 2014 a coworker was dismantling a car when the safety chain slipped and the coworker became pinned under the vehicle; Plaintiff held up the truck cab until his coworker was free, which left him “over exerted.” Second, he testified that in April 2014 he bounced off the fork of a loader that was four inches off the ground and twisted his back, which led to increased symptoms as he tried to work. His last day of work was in June 2015, when Plaintiff claimed he was “kicked out” because the employer would not let him take medication on the job.
The Magistrate denied Plaintiff’s claim based on numerous discrepancies between his testimony at trial and the history contained within various medical records admitted. Specifically, while Plaintiff received treatment in March and April 2014, those records did not include any mention of the alleged injuries. Moreover, other treatment records included a history of chronic back pain for many years. Other records indicated different mechanisms of injury such as falling while putting on pants, sudden numbness in his feet, lifting car parts, and lifting a car hood. No records, outside of a report from one week prior to trial, contained a history of injury that conformed with Plaintiff’s testimony.
It is the Plaintiff’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sustained a work-related injury. Once a decision is rendered by the Magistrate, the Appellate Commission has the power to review the Magistrate’s findings to determine whether they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.
On appeal, Plaintiff argued that there was sufficient evidence for the Magistrate to find a work injury occurred. However, the Commission noted that is not the standard of review; they only determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Magistrate’s findings—no determination is made as to whether more evidence could be accepted for a contrary conclusion.
The Commission upheld the Magistrate’s ruling. It was well within the Magistrate’s powers to determine what testimony, including the Plaintiff and medical providers, was credible.

Murphey v C&J Parking Lot Sweeping (Mich. WCBM 2023)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Castora
Plaintiff alleged that on November 20, 2017 he sustained an injury to his back, as well as PTSD, when he was viciously attacked by the owner of his employer.
At trial, Plaintiff testified that he experienced racism regularly at work. He testified that the day prior to injury he was driving his company-issued truck when the brakes went out. He was surprised, but it was not totally unexpected because the truck had been plagued with maintenance issues. On the DOI Plaintiff reported using another company truck to complete his work. After returning to the lot, he complained to the dispatcher about the ongoing issues. He then alleged that the owner thereafter attacked him; he was choked by his hoodie strings and nearly blacked out. Then, the owner threw him to the ground before punching him in the face. Plaintiff reported that other employees broke it up. He reported that the incident left him very shaken up. Police were called and charges were pressed against the owner.
The next day Plaintiff worked half of his shift but stopped due to back pain. He went to the emergency room that day, after notifying his employer. His back pain continued to worsen, and he developed arm pain. At the time of trial he reported that he experienced nightmares and anxiety about the situation which necessitated ongoing mental health treatment.
On cross-examination, Defendants highlighted Plaintiff’s prior criminal history as a possible source of the alleged PTSD. Plaintiff conceded that he had been in and out of prison; he had been convicted of selling drugs, auto theft, and accessory to murder. He testified that he had cooperated with police and had made enemies of various gangs. He also noted that he had witnessed a murder. He was shot in 2006, but he did not know who did it. He still lived in a gang-controlled neighborhood.
He testified that those experiences were not stressful, because he had chosen them. Further, he claimed that he had vowed to move on from the life of crime, which is why his job was so important to him. Plaintiff also stated that Defendant’s thorough cross-examination was causing PTSD because he was being questioned about “old stuff which he was trying to forget.”
Plaintiff presented an IME report from a psychiatrist, who diagnosed PTSD due to the work altercation. He also presented evidence from multiple treaters related to his back pain, however those providers were not orthopedists. Defendants presented an IME from an orthopedist who opined that Plaintiff had extensive degeneration throughout his back; the doctor was unable to identify a distinct, acute pathology. Moreover, Defendants presented an IME from their own psychiatrist who took a detailed history from Plaintiff, including mental health treatment rendered prior to injury, and ultimately diagnosed him with narcissism and antisocial personality disorder.
The Magistrate noted that there were many inconsistencies between various medical records, police records, and Plaintiff’s trial testimony. He found the Defendant’s IMEs to be more credible than the records put forth by Plaintiff. This was because Defendant’s experts were subject matter experts who explained their conclusions with current evidence-based medicine. Based on this, benefits were denied.

DISABILITY and RESIDUAL WAGE-EARNING CAPACITY
Lewis v Peckham (2023 ACO #13)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Sims
Plaintiff alleged injury to her left knee. She claimed she was trying to move a stuck chair when she felt a pop and pain, which later escalated to being unable to put weight on her knee. Although the injury allegedly took place in March 2017, she was able to continue working—albeit with the assistance of crutches, braces, and canes—until December 2017 when she began PT and was removed from work.
At trial, the Magistrate found that Plaintiff sustained injury to her left knee, however same did not result in wage loss. As such, the magistrate found Plaintiff was not disabled. An order requiring Defendants to pay for related medical expenses was entered.
Plaintiff appealed the finding she was not disabled.
At trial Plaintiff testified she needed assistive devices to walk, including a wheelchair when it is a far distance. She suffered from rheumatoid arthritis (not work-related), but she did not believe it affected her knee. She had back pain that predated the alleged work injury, however she again did not believe it was related. She further testified that in 2015 her back pain had a radicular component that affected her left leg, but it had resolved prior to injury.
With respect to education and prior work experience, Plaintiff had earned a Master of Science in project management. She previously managed construction crews, performed legislative work, and did office management. She was proficient in computer programs such as Word and Excel.
Defendants obtained a vocational assessment, Plaintiff did not. Defendant’s vocational expert utilized the restrictions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, which include restrictions related to her knee and back. He opined that jobs were available within Plaintiff’s skills, training, and education that met her pre-injury maximum wages of $16.35 per hour. He also noted that Plaintiff had not looked for work since the injury and did not provide a reason why.
Plaintiff relied on the testimony of her treating physician, who stated that she was totally and permanently disabled, as conclusive evidence she could not work. However, the Magistrate noted that the treater came to that conclusion based upon Plaintiff’s back and knee; however the law requires that the work-related injury be considered alone when making a determination of disability.
The Magistrate’s holding was affirmed. Plaintiff did not meet her burden in proving that she was disabled due to the knee injury, nor did she show that she was making a good faith job search effort.

Walton v Nexteer Automotive (2023 ACO #4)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Ognisanti
Defendants appealed the Magistrate’s order granting an open award of benefits. Plaintiff alleged disability due to a cervical spine injury that occurred in June 2014, followed by less than 100 weeks in a lighter job before leaving work due to a work-aggravation of bilateral knee issues in August 2015.
At trial, Plaintiff dropped his claim related to the bilateral knees. As such, the Magistrate’s findings related only to 2014 cervical injury.
While treating for the cervical injury, Plaintiff was provided a light duty job performing bench work, which involved performing preventative maintenance on machines. He continued this employment, through May 2015 when he sustained a non-occupational injury to his left knee. He went off work for a short time due to same, but eventually returned in August 2015. The light duty restrictions related to his neck ended in August 2015 as well, but Plaintiff continued performing bench work until his LDW in the same month.
Thereafter, he underwent multiple left knee surgeries, and eventually right knee surgery as well. Just over a year after his LDW, in October 2016, Plaintiff contacted HR to report that he was ready to return to work. However, he was advised that he had lost his seniority and there was no longer a position for him.
Plaintiff eventually obtained subsequent employment as a part-time bus driver. He testified that he did not believe he was capable of full-time employment due to neck pain. His position was supported by an IME report from 2018 in which his doctor opined that he required ongoing restrictions for the neck injury. However, that conclusion was rebutted by Defendant’s own IME report that found Plaintiff did not require any restrictions.
In his opinion, the Magistrate stated Plaintiff attempted to return to his restricted employment, as Plaintiff testified he believed that he had continued neck restrictions. However, the Appellate Commission noted that the record did not support that conclusion, as the plant doctor allow the neck restrictions to expire prior to Plaintiff’s LDW.
The Appellate Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Commission affirmed the Magistrate’s finding that Plaintiff had established a personal injury. However, the Magistrate’s finding that Plaintiff was disabled was reversed and remanded; in his opinion the Magistrate did not consider the bench work job as part of Plaintiff’s prior work history, nor did he give it consideration regarding the type of jobs that Plaintiff would be able to perform. As such, the Commission believed that further findings regarding Plaintiff’s employment capabilities was needed prior to determining whether he was disabled.

UIA COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS
Bellamy v Sundance (2023 ACO #11)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Watkinson
Timely claim for review filed by Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency, based on the Magistrate’s order denying UIA’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Subpoena Demanding Production of Records and further finding the UIA in contempt for refusing to produce the requested records.
UIA argued that the records, unemployment benefits, were exempt from disclosure. However, the Appellate Commission disagreed. They noted that the statute specifically noted that “information in the unemployment agency’s possession that might affect a claim for worker’s disability compensation under the worker’s disability compensation act must be available to interested parties”. Based on the statute, the Commission held that the UIA must produce the records requested by Defendants.
However, the Commission reversed the Magistrate’s finding of contempt. This was because the UIA responded to Defendant’s subpoena by filing a Motion to Quash, which was an appropriate response. The Commission distinguished this from other matters where the UIA was held in contempt after blatantly ignoring and refusing to respond to subpoena requests.

SHOOT THROUGH LIABILITY
Overley v J Stevens Construction (2023 ACO #5)
WDCAC – Appeal from Magistrate Williams
Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell off a roof while working at a construction site. Plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor, which was organized as an LLC. The subcontractor signed an agreement with J Stevens Construction, the named defendant, to assist with a roofing project. The agreement required the subcontractor to have workers’ compensation insurance, but it did not.
Defendants argued that the subcontractor did not have authority to enter into a binding employment agreement with Plaintiff on their behalf. However, the Magistrate disagreed. He found that the subcontractor acted as an agent of Defendants; the subcontractor held himself out as having authority to act on behalf of Defendants and this action was subsequently ratified by Defendants.
In coming to this conclusion, it was noted that authority can be express or implied. In this case, the subcontractor had implied authority, based upon statements and actions that would reasonably lead Plaintiff to believe that the subcontractor was acting on Defendant’s behalf. The Magistrate noted that the subcontractor was driving a vehicle with Defendant’s logo and working on Defendant’s jobsite. There was no evidence that Defendants took any action to disavow the subcontractor’s behavior.
Accordingly, the Commission held that Defendant was Plaintiff’s employer at the time of injury based on the shoot-through provision.

ASSISTIVE DEVICES (“APPLIANCES”)
Strick v Tradesman International (Mich. WCBM 2022)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Kales
Plaintiff was a 26-year-old man that sustained a severe work injury in October 2020 that rendered him a quadriplegic. As a result of the injury, Plaintiff must use a joystick operated wheelchair and specially modified vans. Defendants voluntarily paid benefits, including payment for a van service. Plaintiff filed litigation after he requested that a van be purchased and modified; Defendants did not agree to purchase the van, however they did pay for modifications after Plaintiff obtained a loan and purchased a van himself.
The sole issue at trial was whether Defendants had a legal obligation to purchase a vehicle for Plaintiff, thus incurring all costs of purchase and modification.
In addition to the Act requiring that an employer provide reasonable medical treatment, it also requires that an injured employee be supplied with “dental services, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances as necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury.”
Defendants argued that the van in question was not an “appliance” within the meaning of the Act. This was based on a cannon of statutory construction known as Ejusdem Generis; this means that when general words or phrases follow several specific words, the general words are construed as limited and apply only to things of the same kind as those expressly mentioned. Vans are distinctly different from the items listed (crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth), therefore it should not be included as “other appliances.”
Plaintiff argued for a plain language interpretation of the statute. The Webster dictionary definition of “appliance” is “an instrument or device designed for a particular use or function.” It was his position that a van clearly met this definition.
The Magistrate agreed with Plaintiff. He noted the Act’s stated goal of providing appliances is to “cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relive from the effects of the injury.” Each injury must be carefully considered, but the ultimate intent of the legislation was humanitarian in nature. The Magistrate held that Defendants were liable for purchasing the appropriate van for Plaintiff and incurring all costs associated with modification.

COORDINATION OF BENEFITS
Winston v General Motors (Mich. WCBM 2022)
Board of Magistrates – Magistrate Housefield
The collective bargaining agreement in place between Defendant and the UAW changed after Plaintiff’s injury; it was based upon this change that Plaintiff brought suit. Plaintiff was being voluntarily paid benefits pursuant to a voluntary payment agreement. In addition, he received a disability retirement pension from GM and Social Security disability benefits.
Pursuant to a change in the collective bargaining agreement, Defendant changed the formula by which it determined the amount of workers’ compensation benefits owed.  Specifically, the new agreement stated that worker’s compensation benefits would be determined by adding together the weekly disability retirement pension amount, weekly social security benefit amount, and the original amount of weekly worker’s compensation benefits. This would then be compared to their average weekly wage prior to injury to determine if there was a difference.
The sole issue at trial was whether use of Plaintiff’s Social Security Disability benefits in the calculation was a violation of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Section 354 of the Act explains what benefits can be coordinated with workers’ compensation benefits. These include social security old age benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, and employer funded short- and long-term disability benefits. Social security disability benefits are noted as well, however they are not currently available to coordinate because the Federal government reduces SSDI benefits based upon any amount of workers’ compensation benefits being paid.
Plaintiff argued that it was illegal for Defendant to use SSDI benefits as part of the formula through which it coordinated worker’s compensation benefits. It was his position that the collective bargaining agreement could not supersede the Act by creating an alternative method of coordination.
The Magistrate held that Defendant’s use of the SSDI benefit amount in a formula agreed to through collective bargaining did not violate Section 354, nor any other provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In coming to this conclusion, he noted that the collective bargaining agreement, and any modifications to it, is a matter of federal law. Moreover, he noted that Defendant did not “coordinate” benefits as discussed in Section 354, but rather according to the formula agreed to in the collective bargaining agreement.